Shuffle Up and Deal: Analyzing the Security of Automated Card Shufflers

Security

Analyzing the security flaws in automated card shufflers, this talk reveals how predicting shuffle outcomes, weak authentication and lack of encryption enable cheating and hacking scenarios, compromising poker games and casinos.

Key takeaways

The security of automated card shufflers can be compromised by predicting the outcome of the shuffle.
Cheating scenarios can be executed using a second accomplice, who is watching the table and knows the shuffle outcome.
Weak authentication and lack of encryption in the G2S protocol make it vulnerable to attacks.
The Decimate 2 shuffle has a predictable random number generation (RNG) due to its use of a timer as its entropy source.
The GATT protocol used by the Deckmate 2 has security issues, including weak authentication and no encryption.
The shuffler’s serial GATT implementation is vulnerable to attacks due to its use of a single command packet.
The firmware update process for the shuffle is also vulnerable to attacks due to the lack of proper authentication and encryption.
The cheat scenario involves a second shovel that allows the cheater to know the shuffle outcome and alter the card order.
There is no secure way to know the exact order of the deck, which makes it difficult to detect cheaters.
The shuffler’s firmware can be modified to allow cheating, and the HMAC SHA-1 authentication can be bypassed.
The shuffler’s control board has a custom software update utility that allows for configuration and modification of the shuffle algorithm.
The shuffler’s display module has a camera that records suit and rank information, which can be used to predict the outcome of the shuffle.
The shuffler’s firmware can be modified to allow cheating, and the shuffle algorithm can be compromised.
The G2S protocol used by the shuffle has weak authentication and no encryption, which makes it vulnerable to attacks.

Shuffle Up and Deal: Analyzing the Security of Automated Card Shufflers

More talks