SAINTCON 2023 - Chad Walker - Securing Big Stupid Machines

Learn how to secure industrial control systems with a focus on operational risk and recovery, debunking common myths and showcasing practical strategies for mitigating attacks and minimizing downtime at SAINTCON 2023.

Key takeaways
  • The CIA triad needs to be reconsidered for big stupid machines, focusing on operational risk and recovery.
  • The process layer is the most critical, as it’s where the machines do the work, and it’s often the most vulnerable.
  • It’s not about securing the machines, but about securing the relationships between them and the networks they’re connected to.
  • The data historian is a critical component, as it’s where data is stored and processed, and it’s often a single point of failure.
  • Network segmentation is key to securing big stupid machines, as it allows for isolation and containment of attacks.
  • Recovery is more important than prevention and detection, as it’s often the most effective way to mitigate the impact of an attack.
  • The Purdue model of ICS architecture is a useful framework for understanding the different layers of an industrial control system.
  • It’s important to consider the inventory of PLCs and HMIs, as well as their firmware and software versions, to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  • The Zigbee protocol is a common vulnerability in industrial control systems, as it’s often used for communication between devices.
  • It’s important to prioritize operational risk and recovery, as it’s often the most critical aspect of an industrial control system.
  • The big stupid machines are often the most vulnerable, as they’re often the most critical to the operation of the facility.
  • It’s important to consider the human factor, as human error is often a major contributor to industrial control system failures.
  • The data historian is a critical component, as it’s where data is stored and processed, and it’s often a single point of failure.
  • Network segmentation is key to securing big stupid machines, as it allows for isolation and containment of attacks.
  • Recovery is more important than prevention and detection, as it’s often the most effective way to mitigate the impact of an attack.
  • The Purdue model of ICS architecture is a useful framework for understanding the different layers of an industrial control system.
  • It’s important to consider the inventory of PLCs and HMIs, as well as their firmware and software versions, to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  • The Zigbee protocol is a common vulnerability in industrial control systems, as it’s often used for communication between devices.
  • It’s important to prioritize operational risk and recovery, as it’s often the most critical aspect of an industrial control system.